The Library

Two shelves. Curated maps have been traced end to end and reviewed. The working shelf holds questions Debby has drafted but no person has signed off on. 1 of 6 debates are mapped so far.

All Theology Philosophy Ethics Epistemology

Worldview:All Orthodoxy Materialism Islam Protestantism Buddhism Vedānta Agnosticism Deism

Curated maps

Every chain traced to a terminus and reviewed.

Theology

Can materialism account for the preconditions of intelligibility — logic, mathematics, morality?

Eastern Orthodox TAG vs. Materialist Atheism

Eastern OrthodoxagainstMaterialist Atheism

#transcendental-argument#materialism#orthodoxy

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The working shelf

Questions we have not closed

Live research maps assembled by Debby from the sources it has read. Nothing here is a Library verdict — assembled from sources by the analysis pipeline. Not reviewed, not published as a Library verdict.

Argument incompleteEpistemology · drafted by Debby, unreviewed

Can a transcendental argument reach the world, or only our beliefs?

The strongest version of the argument we could find still has a gap we have not closed.

Does a transcendental or TAG-style argument establish mind-independent worldly X, or only belief/appearance that X?

Thought/knowledge presupposition → mind-independent worldly ground?
Argument incomplete
Strongest case · A world-directed transcendental argument needs □(T → X), not merely □(T → B(X)). Proponents propose revelational epistemology and divine-mind grounding as the stronger conditional; rivals press Stroud’s substitution (belief-only) countermodel.
What it still does not settle · No checked packet independently establishes the stronger conditional for the Orthodox-Christian ground without assuming the revelation/metaphysics in dispute.
Can Sher-style formal/structural realism undercut TAG’s only-mind exclusion?
Argument incomplete
Strongest case · Sher supplies an explicit formal-structural account of logical laws with truth-based normativity claims; TAG must show why that terminus fails under the same rubric rather than label it impersonal by fiat.
What it still does not settle · Normativity and reliable access bridges remain OPEN on both sides after source-symmetric testing.

Argument incompleteTheology · drafted by Debby, unreviewed

Why exactly three divine persons?

The strongest version of the argument we could find still has a gap we have not closed.

Is there a non-arbitrary account of why there must be exactly three divine persons, and does monarchy-of-the-Father close that gap?

Why exactly three divine persons, non-arbitrarily?
Argument incomplete
Strongest case · Monarchical Trinitarianism (Branson) and Conciliar/semantic arguments (Sijuwade) steelman a three-personed model that identifies the one God with the Father while remaining Trinitarian on their definitions; EO tradition supplies monarchy and Filioque rejection as coherence constraints.
What it still does not settle · No surveyed model independently derives necessity of exactly three rather than another cardinality; the fifth independent Orthodox proponent checked (Fr. Dcn. Ananias Sorem, live Q&A) twice began to state a monad–dyad–triad necessity argument and twice declined to finish it on air, while also offering the clearest 'the question itself is wrong' dissolve framing yet recorded — a genuinely new move, but one that only partially meets this program's own bar for an adjudicable criterion revision. ARGUMENT_INCOMPLETE on the core necessity gap.
Does Branson’s monarchy answer Tuggy’s unitarian classification?
Costs on both sides
Strongest case · Branson separates predicative vs referential (WIG) problems and offers Monarchical Trinitarianism as genuinely three-personed yet WIG-solving; Tuggy counters classification and historical-universality claims.
What it still does not settle · SYMMETRIC_COST on the narrow Branson–Tuggy exchange; core OTC-002 necessity gap untouched.

Awaiting human reviewEthics · drafted by Debby, unreviewed

Can anything ground a moral obligation that actually binds?

A revised standard has been drafted, but no person has signed off on it yet.

What follows from the is/ought gap, and does the best account of objective moral obligation uniquely entail Eastern Orthodoxy?

(a) Does EO’s account of good + freedom + practical reason cohere?
Argument incomplete
Strongest case · Inside the EO working hypothesis, refusing Logos-order / theosis is misuse of the rational creature (free will can refuse; rationality = Logos-fidelity), not a live coherent outsider stance.
What it still does not settle · A rival can grant EO metaphysics verbally while denying that rationality = constitutive-end fidelity — scored under Coh/Real if §6 freezes, still open under F_old (c).
(b) What grounds the good (ontology of theosis / Logos)?
Argument incomplete
Strongest case · Maximus Amb. 7 / Qu. Thal. supply dense teleological ontology; theosis is categorically distinct from hedonic preference or external carrot/stick.
What it still does not settle · Primary Maximus texts do not derive categorical agent-binding ought; Tollefsen’s “also certain obligations” gloss over-claims relative to the wording checked.
(c) Normative force — categorical binding vs dissolved question-shape
Awaiting human review
Strongest case · C5 dual-label: TAG practice inventory does include ethics/morality as load-bearing (Finding A). Path A §6 draft dissolves non-theistic shape of (c) into constitutive practical rationality.
What it still does not settle · Finding B: categorical moral obligation not yet shown as retorsive precondition of intelligibility. F_old (c) still ARGUMENT_INCOMPLETE; F_rev not frozen.
EO synergy vs strongest Muslim responsibility accounts
Costs on both sides
Strongest case · Ashʿarī kasb and Māturīdī ikhtiyār are steelmanned as concurrentist, not crude determinism; EO synergy remains a coherent alternative.
What it still does not settle · Decree + responsibility comparative tag: SYMMETRIC_COST (esp. vs Māturīdī). Blocks “Islam = determinism” shortcuts.