Must first-order knowledge rest on the correct metaphysical ground?
Does ordinary knowledge require the correct ultimate metaphysical ground, or can it succeed on a false or incomplete one?
Last packet 30 July 2026 · 4 research notes
How to read this page
Assembled from sources by the analysis pipeline. Not reviewed, not published as a Library verdict. The collapse-from-wrong-ground premise is still incomplete after specialist tests. Not a Library verdict. This is not a claim that Eastern Orthodoxy — or any other school — has been established as the truth.
Draft research note
This page is a working note, not a settled Library verdict. The question is still open. If you know a source that bears on it — a lecture, an article, a primary text — you can suggest it. A person reads every suggestion before anything is published. Suggestions cannot publish themselves.
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The strongest case
The recorded case is that if you have the wrong ultimate ground, you cannot really know — ordinary reasoning would be borrowed capital.
What it still does not settle
Using reliable cognitive powers and correctly describing their ultimate ground can come apart. The extra premise that they collapse has not been supplied; some theist epistemologists themselves treat the two as separable.
4 further research notes are still in researcher language (internal IDs, packet filenames, extraction state). Those notes stay in the research workspace. This page only shows copy written for readers.