Is Morality Objective Without God?
What follows from the is/ought gap, and does the best account of objective obligation uniquely entail Eastern Orthodoxy?
Interlocutors: Jay Dyer
Graph not drawn yet
The node graph for this debate is not drawn yet. The published working case — drafted by Debby, not a Library verdict — is the map to read.
Whether the good can be described without showing that it obligates anyone: the gap between fact and duty, the Orthodox account of what a person is for, and the strongest rival accounts of responsibility. Drafted by Debby from the sources; not reviewed, and not a Library verdict.
Can anything ground a moral obligation that actually binds?
Everyone in this argument can tell you what the good is. Nobody has yet shown why it obligates a person who declines it. Orthodoxy, naturalism and Islamic theology each hit the same wall in the same place, which is either a scandal or a sign that the question has been mis-posed.
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